We consider the noise complexity of differentially private mechanisms in the setting where the user asks d linear queries f : R n → R non-adaptively. Here, the database is represented by a vector in R n and proximity between databases is measured in the 1-metric. We show that the noise complexity is determined by two geometric parameters associated with the set of queries. We use this connection to give tight upper and lower bounds on the noise complexity for any d ≤ n. We show that for d random linear queries of sensitivity 1, it is necessary and sufficient to add 2-error
INTRODUCTION
The problem of Privacy-preserving data analysis has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. Several databases, * Supported by NSF grants CCF-0426582 and CCF-0832797. Part of this work has been done while the author visited Microsoft Research Silicon Valley.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. e.g. those held by the Census Bureau, contain private data provided by individuals, and protecting the privacy of those individuals is an important concern. Differential Privacy is a rigorous notion of privacy that allows statistical analysis of sensitive data while providing strong privacy guarantees even in the presence of an adversary armed with arbitrary auxiliary information. We refer the reader to the survey of Dwork [7] and the references therein for further motivation and background information.
We consider the following setup: A database is represented by a vector x ∈ R n . The queries that the analyst may ask are linear combinations of the entries of x. In general, a multidimensional query is a map F : R n → R d , and we will restrict ourselves to linear maps F with coefficients in the interval [−1, 1]. Thus F is a d×n matrix with entries in [−1, 1] . In this work, we assume throughout that d ≤ n. A mechanism is a randomized algorithm which holds a database x ∈ R n , receives a query F : R n → R d and answers with some a ∈ R d . Informally, we say a mechanism satisfies differential privacy in this setting if the densities of the output distributions on inputs x, x ∈ R n with x − x 1 ≤ 1 are point wise within an exp( ) multiplicative factor of each other. Here and in the following, > 0 is a parameter that measures the strength of the privacy guarantee (smaller being a stronger guarantee). The error of a mechanism is the expected Euclidean distance between the correct answer F x and the actual answer a. Here the expectation is taken over the coin tosses of the mechanism; we consider the worst case error over all databases.
In this work, we use methods from convex geometry to determine a nearly optimal trade-off between privacy and error. We give a lower bound on how much error any differentially private mechanism must add. And we present a mechanism whose error nearly matches this lower bound.
The above setup is fairly general. To illustrate it and facilitate comparison with previous work, we will describe some specific instantiations below.
Histograms.

Suppose we have a database D ∈ [n]
m , containing private information about m individuals. We can think of each individual as belonging to one of n types. The database D can then naturally be translated to a histogram x ∈ R n , i.e., xi counts the number of individuals of type i. In this case, the parameter m corresponds to the sparsity of x. Note that in the definition of differential privacy, we require the mechanism to be defined for all x ∈ R n and demand that the output distributions be close whenever x − x 1 ≤ 1. This is a stronger requirement than asserting this property only for integer vectors x and x . It only makes our upper bounds stronger. For the lower bounds, this strengthening allows us to ignore the discretization issues that would arise in the usual definition. Our lower bounds can be extended for the usual definition for very small and large enough m. We note that better mechanisms do exist for small m. Now, our upper bound holds for any linear query on the histogram. This includes some well-studied and natural classes of queries. For instance, contingency tables (see, e.g., [1] ) and counting queries are both linear queries on the histogram.
Private bits.
In the setting looked at by Dinur and Nissim [6] , the database D ∈ {0, 1} m consists of one private bit for each individual and each query ask for the number of 1's amongst a (random) subset on [m] . Given d such queries, one can define n ≤ 2 d types of individuals, depending on the subset of the queries that ask about an individual. The database D then maps to a histogram x in the natural way with xi denoting the number of individuals of type i with their private bit set to 1. Our results then imply a lower bound of Ω(d/ ) per answer for any -differentially private mechanism. This improves on the Ω( √ d) bound for d = m from [6] for a weaker privacy definition (blatant non-privacy). A closely related rephrasing is to imagine each individual having d private {0, 1} attributes so that n = 2 d . The d queries that ask for the 1-way marginals of the input naturally map to a matrix / ) error is attainable under the relaxed notion of ( , δ)-differential privacy.
Other settings.
One can also look at x itself as a database where each individuals private data is in [0, 1] ; in this setting the dimension of the data n equals the number of individuals m. Our results lead to better upper bounds for this setting. Finally, there are settings such as the recent work of [23] on private recommendation systems, where the private data is transformed with a stability guarantee so that nearby databases get mapped to vectors at 1 distance at most 1.
Our results
We first relate the noise complexity of differentially private mechanisms to geometric properties of the image of the unit 1-ball B n 1 when applying the linear mapping F . We will denote the resulting convex polytope by K = F B n 1 . Our first result lower bounds the noise any -differentially private mechanism must add in terms of the volume of K. Theorem 1.1. Let > 0 and suppose F : R n → R d is a linear map. Then, every -private mechanism M has error at least Ω(
Recall, the term error refers to the expected Euclidean distance between the output of the mechanism and the correct answer to the query F . As mentioned before, our lower bounds make use of the fact that the mechanism M is defined on all points x ∈ R n rather than only on x ∈ Z n + . While all mechanism we are aware of satisfy this stronger requirement, we remark that it would be interesting to achieve the same lower bound under the weaker assumption.
We then describe a differentially private mechanism whose error depends on the expected 2 norm of a randomly chosen point in K. Our mechanism is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism [24] with the score function defined by the (negative of the) norm · K . Hence, we will refer to this mechanism as the K-norm mechanism. Theorem 1.2. Let > 0 and suppose F : R n → R d is a linear map with K = F B n 1 . Then, the K-norm mechanism is -differentially private and has error at most
As it turns out, when F is a random Bernoulli ±1 matrix our upper bound matches the lower bound up to constant factors. In this case, K is a random polytope and its volume and average Euclidean norm have been determined rather recently. Specifically, we apply a volume lower bound of Litvak et al. [22] , and an upper bound on the average Euclidean norm due to Klartag and Kozma [21] . Quantitatively, we obtain the following theorem.
On the other hand, the K-norm mechanism is -differentially private with error
We remark that Litvak et al. also give an explicit construction of a mapping F realizing the lower bound. More generally, we can relate our upper and lower bounds whenever the body K is in approximately isotropic position. Informally, this condition implies that
Here, LK denotes the so-called isotropic constant which is defined in Section 5.2.
is in approximately isotropic position. Then, the K-norm mechanism is -differentially private with error at most O(
, where LK denotes the isotropic constant of K.
Notice that the bound in the previous theorem differs from the lower bound by a factor of LK . A central conjecture in convex geometry, sometimes referred to as the "Hyperplane Conjecture" or "Slicing Conjecture" (see [21] for further information) states that LK = O(1). Unfortunately, in general the polytope K could be very far from isotropic. In this case, both our volume-based lower bound and the K-norm mechanism can be quite far from optimal. We give a recursive variant of our mechanism and a natural generalization of our volume-based lower bound which are nearly optimal even if K is non-isotropic.
Further, assume the Hyperplane Conjecture. Then, the mechanism introduced in Section 6 isdifferentially private and has error at most O(log 3/2 d) · GLB(F, ), where GLB(F, ) is a lower bound on the error of the optimal -differentially private mechanism.
While we restricted our theorems to F ∈ [−1, 1] d×n , they apply more generally to any linear mapping F. We remark that unlike the Laplace mechanism which can deal with 
2-error
Laplacian noise [9] − queries being presented one at a time, and chosen adaptively, we require knowledge of the full matrix F of queries in advance. We leave open the question of relaxing this constraint.
Efficient Mechanisms.
Our mechanism is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism and involves sampling random points from rather general high-dimensional convex bodies. This is why our mechanism is not efficient as it is. However, we can use rapidly mixing geometric random walks for the sampling step. These random walks turn out to approach the uniform distribution in a metric that is strong enough for our purposes. It will follow that both of our mechanisms can be implemented in polynomial time. Theorem 1.6. The mechanisms given in Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.5 can be implemented in time polynomial in n, 1/ such that the stated error bound remains the same up to constant factors, and the mechanism achievesdifferential privacy.
We point our that our lower bound GLB can also be approximated up to a constant factor.Together these results give polynomial time computable upper and lower bounds on the error of any differentially private mechanism, that are always within an O(log 3/2 d) of each other assuming the Hyperplane conjecture. Figure 1 .1 summarizes our results. Note that we state our bounds in terms of the total 2 error, which is a √ d factor larger than the average per coordinate error.
Previous Work
Queries of the kind described above have sensitivity d, and hence the work of Dwork et al. [9] shows that adding Laplace noise with parameter d/ to each entry of F x ensures -differential privacy. Moreover, adding Laplace noise to the histogram x itself leads to another private mechanism. Thus such questions can be answered with noise min(d/ , √ n/ , m) per entry of F x. Some specific classes of queries can be answered with smaller error. Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [26] show that one can add noise proportional to a smoothed version of the local sensitivity of the query, which can be much smaller than the global sensitivity for some non-linear queries. Building on [24] , Blum, Ligett and Roth [4] show that it is possible to answer d counting queries (a special case of linear queries) with error O(m 2/3 poly log(n, d)). This bound is better than ours when d m. Feldman et al. [13] construct private core sets for the k-median problem, enabling approximate computation of the k-median cost of any set of k facilities in R d . Private mechanisms with small error, for other classes of queries have also been studied in several other works, see e.g. [3, 1, 24, 5, 19, 16] . Dinur and Nissim [6] initiated the study of lower bounds on the amount of noise private mechanisms must add. They showed that any private mechanism that answersÕ(m) random subset sum queries about a set of m people each having a private bit must add noise Ω( √ m) to avoid nearly full disclosure of the database (blatant non-privacy). This implies that as one answers more and more questions, the amount of error needed per answer must grow to provide any kind of privacy guarantee. These results were strengthened by Dwork, McSherry and Talwar [10] , and by Dwork and Yekhanin [11] . However all these lower bounds protect against blatant non-privacy and cannot go beyond noise larger than min( √ d, √ m) per answer, for d queries. Kasiviswanathan, Rudelson and Smith [18] show lower bounds of the same nature (min(
for a more natural and useful class of questions. Their lower bounds also apply to ( , δ)-differential privacy and are tight when and δ are constant. For the case of d = 1, Ghosh, Roughgarden and Sundararajan [14] show that adding Laplace noise is in fact optimal in a very general decision-theoretic framework, for any symmetric decreasing loss function. For the case that all sum queries need to be answered (i.e. all queries of the form fP (D) = P m i=1 P (Di) where P is a 0-1 predicate), Dwork et al. [9] show that any differentially private mechanism must add noise Ω(m). Rastogi et al. [27] show that half of such queries must have error Ω( √ m). Blum, Ligett and Roth [4] show that any differentially private mechanism answering all (real-valued) halfspace queries must add noise Ω(m).
Overview and organization of the paper
In this section we will give a broad overview of our proof and outline the remainder of the paper.
We prove our lower bound in Section 3. Given a query
. If the volume of K is large, then a packing argument shows that we can pack exponentially many points inside K so that each pair of points is far from each other. We then scale up K by a suitable factor λ. By linearity, all points within λK have preimages under F that are still λ-close in 1-distance. Hence, the definition of -differential privacy (by transitivity) enforces some constraint between these preimages. We can combine these observations so as to show that any differentially private mechanism M will have to put significant probability mass in exponentially many disjoint balls. This forces the mechanism to have large expected error.
We then introduce the K-norm mechanism in Section 4. Our mechanism computes F x and then adds a noise vector to F x. The key point here is that the noise vector is not independent of F as in previous works. Instead, informally speaking, the noise is tailored to the exact shape of K = F B n 1 . This is accomplished by picking a particular noise vector z with probability proportional to exp(− z K ). Here, · K denotes the (Minkowski) norm defined by K. While our mechanism depends upon the query F , it does not depend on the particular database x. We can analyze our mechanism in terms of the expected Euclidean distance from the origin of a random point in K, i.e., Ez∈K z 2. Arguing optimality of our mechanism hence boils down to relating Ez∈K z 2 to the volume of K. Indeed, using several results from convex geometry, we observe that our lower and upper bounds match up to constant factors when F is drawn at random from {−1, 1} d×n . The polytope K can be interpreted as the symmetric convex hull of the row vectors of F. When F is a random matrix, K is a well-studied random polytope. Some recent results on random polytopes give us suitable lower bounds on the volume and upper bounds on the average Euclidean norm. More generally, our bounds are tight whenever K is in isotropic position (as pointed out in Section 5.2). This condition intuitively gives a relation between volume and average distance from the origin. Our bounds are actually only tight up to a factor of LK , the isotropic constant of K. A well-known conjecture from convex geometry, known as the Hyperplane Conjecture or Slicing Conjecture, implies that LK = O(1).
The problem is that when F is not drawn at random, K could be very far from isotropic. In this case, the K-norm mechanism by itself might actually perform poorly. We thus give a recursive variant of the K-norm mechanism in Section 6 which can handle non-isotropic bodies. Our approach is based on analyzing the covariance matrix of K in order to partition K into parts on which our earlier mechanism performs well. Assuming the Hyperplane conjecture, we derive bounds on the error of our mechanism that are optimal to within polylogarithmic factors.
While our mechanisms are not efficient as they are, we finally show how they can actually be implemented in polynomial time. Our result follow from efficient sampling techniques for convex bodies using geometric random walks.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation.
We will write B d p to denote the unit ball of the p-norm in R d . When K ⊆ R d is a centrally symmetric convex set, we write · K for the (Minkowski) norm defined by K (i.e. x K = inf{r : x ∈ rK}). The p-norms are denoted by · p, but we use · as a shorthand for the Euclidean norm
Differential Privacy
Definition 2.1. A mechanism M is a family of probability measures M = {µx : x ∈ R n } where each measure µx is defined on R d . A mechanism is called -differentially private, if for all x, y ∈ R n such that x − y 1 ≤ 1, we have
≤ exp( ), where the supremum runs over all measurable subsets S ⊆ R d .
A common weakening of -differential privacy is the following notion of approximate privacy. Definition 2.2. A mechanism is called δ-approximatedifferentially private, if for all x, y ∈ R n such that µx(S) ≤
The definition of privacy is transitive in the following sense.
Fact 2.3. If M is an -differentially private mechanism and x, y ∈ R n satisfy x − y 1 ≤ k, then for measurable
Let F : R n → R d and :
When it comes to approximate privacy, the Gaussian mechanism [8] shows that for any mapping F :
Isotropic Position
Definition 2.5 (Isotropic Position). We say a convex body K ⊆ R d is in isotropic position with isotropic constant LK if for every unit vector
A standard fact is that for every convex body K ⊆ R d , there is a volume-preserving linear transformation T such that T K is in isotropic position. For an arbitrary convex body K, its isotropic constant LK can then be defined to be LT K where T brings L to isotropic position. It is known (e.g. [25] ) that T is unique up to an orthogonal transformation and thus this is well-defined. We refer the reader to the paper of Milman and Pajor [25] , as well as the extensive survey of Giannopoulos [15] for a proof of this fact and other facts regarding the isotropic constant.
Gamma Distribution
The Gamma distribution with shape parameter k > 0 and scale θ > 0, denoted Gamma(k, θ), is given by the probability density function f (r; k, θ) = r 
LOWER BOUNDS FROM VOLUME ES-TIMATES
In this section we show that lower bounds on the volume of the convex body F B n 1 ⊆ R d give rise to lower bounds on the error that any private mechanism must have with respect to F . For that we will need a formal definition of private mechanism and its error. 
, the body K has the volume of a ball of radius r ∈ Ω(R √ d). Any maximal
-packing then has the desired property. 
Proof. Let λ ≥ 1 be some scalar and put R = Vol(K) ) and hence we may assume that every x ∈ X satisfies x 1 ≤ λ.
We will now assume that M = {µx : x ∈ R n } is andifferentially private mechanism with error cd √ dR/ and lead this to a contradiction for small enough c > 0. For this we set λ = d/2 . By the assumption on the error, Markov's inequality implies that for all x ∈ X, we have µx(Bx) ≥ , where Bx is a ball of radius 2cd 
We have thus obtained a contradiction.
We denote by LB(F, )) the lower bound resulting from the above theorem. In other words
Thus any -differentially private mechanism must add noise Ω(LB(F, )).
We will later need the following modification of the previous argument which gives a lower bound in the case where K is close to a lower dimensional subspace and hence the volume inside this subspace may give a stronger lower bound. Suppose P is the orthogonal projection operator of a kdimensional subspace of R d for some 1 ≤ k ≤ d. Then, we claim that every -differentially private mechanism M for F :
To see this note that a differentially private answer a to F can be projected down to a (differentially private) answer P a to P F and P is norm 1 operator. We will therefore denote by GLB(F, ) the best lower bound obtainable in this manner, i.e., GLB(F, ) = sup
where the supremum is taken over all k and all k-dimensional orthogonal projections P .
A separation result.
We use this paragraph to point out that our lower bound immediately implies a separation between approximate differential privacy (see Definition 2.2) and exact differential privacy (as used throughout the paper). The Gaussian mechanism gives a mechanism providing δ-approximate -differential privacy with error o( −1 p log(n/d)) as long as δ ≥ 1/n o(1) . Our lower bound in Theorem 5.2 on the other hand states that the error of any -differentially private mechanism must be Ω( −1 p log(n/d)) (assuming d log(n)). We get the strongest separation when d ≤ log(n) and δ is constant. In this case, our lower bound is a factor √ d larger than the upper bound for approximate differential privacy.
THE K-NORM MECHANISM
In this section we describe a new differentially private mechanism, which we call the K-norm mechanism. Definition 4.1 (K-norm mechanism). Given a linear map F : R n → R d and > 0, we let K = F B n 1 and define the mechanism KM(F, d, ) = {µx : x ∈ R n } so that each measure µx is given by the probability density function
which is independent of x.
A more concrete view of the mechanism is provided by Figure 2 and justified in the next remark.
Remark 4.2. We can sample from the distribution µx as follows: First, sample r from the Gamma distribution with parameter d + 1 and scale Second, sample a uniformly from F x + rK. Indeed, if a − F x K = R, then the distribution of a as above follows the probability density function
The next theorem shows that the K-norm mechanism is indeed differentially private. Moreover, we can express its error in terms of the expected distance from the origin of a random point in K.
is a linear map and put K = F B n 1 . Then, the mechanism KM (F, d, ) is -differentially private, and for every p > 0 achieves the error bound Ea∼µ
In particular, the 2-error is at most d+1 Ez∈K z 2.
Proof. To argue the error bound, we will follow Remark 4.
where we used Equation 2 in the last step. When p = 1,
= d + 1. Privacy follows from the fact that the mechanism is a special case of the exponential mechanism [24] . For completeness, we repeat the argument. Suppose that x 1 ≤ 1. It suffices to show that for all a ∈ R d , the densities of µ0 and µx are within multiplicative exp( ), i.e.,
where in the first inequality we used the triangle inequality for · K . In the second step we used that x ∈ B n 1 and hence F x ∈ F B n 1 = K which means F x K ≤ 1. Hence, the mechanism satisfies -differential privacy.
OPTIMALITY FOR RANDOM QUERIES AND ISOTROPIC BODIES
In this section, we will show that our upper bound matches our lower bound when F is a random query. A key observation is that F B n 1 is the symmetric convex hull of n (random) points {v1, . . . , vn} ⊆ R d , i.e., the convex hull of {±v1, . . . , ±vn}, where vi ∈ R d is the ith column of F . The symmetric convex hull of random points has been studied extensively in the theory of random polytopes. A recent result of Litvak, Pajor, Rudelson and Tomczak-Jaegermann [22] gives the following lower bound on the volume of the convex hull.
Theorem 5.1 ([22] ). Let 2d ≤ n ≤ 2 d and let F denote a random d × n Bernoulli matrix. Then,
with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(d β n 1−β )) for any β ∈ (0, 1 2 ). Furthermore, there is an explicit construction of n points in {−1, 1} d whose convex hull achieves the same volume.
The bound in (7) is tight up to constant factors. A well known result [2] shows that the volume of the convex hull of any n points on the sphere in R d of radius √ d is bounded by
Notice, that in our case
2 and in fact the vertices of K are points on the (d − 1)-dimensional sphere of radius √ d. However, equation (7) states that the normalized volume of the random polytope K will be proportional to the volume of the Euclidean ball of radius p log(n/d) rather than √ d. When d log n, this means that the volume of K will be tiny compared to the volume of the infinity ball B d ∞ . Note that (7) does not apply when d ≤ log n. But in that case it is easy to get a lower bound as follows: Simply consider F corresponding to all n points of the boolean hypercube {−1,
This explains why we get qualitatively different answers below and above d = log(n). By combining the volume lower bound with Theorem 3.4, we get the following lower bound on the error of private mechanisms.
Theorem 5.2. Let > 0 and 0 < d ≤ n/2. Then, for almost all matrices F ∈ {−1, 1} d×n , every -differentially private mechanism M must have
Upper bound on average Euclidean norm
Klartag and Kozma [21] recently gave a bound on the quantity Ez∼K z when K = F B n 1 for random F.
Theorem 5.3 ([21]
). Let F be a random d × n Bernoulli matrix and put K = F B n 1 . Then, there is a constant C > 0 so that with probability greater than 1−Ce
An application of Jensen's inequality thus gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. Let > 0 and 0 < d ≤ n/2. Then, for almost all matrices F ∈ {−1, 1} d×n , the mechanism KM (F, d, ) is -differentially private with error at most
Approximately isotropic bodies
The following definition is a relaxation of nearly isotropic position used in literature (e.g., [17] 
The results of Klartag and Kozma [21] referred to in the previous section show that the symmetric convex hull n random points from the d-dimensional hypercube are in O(1)-approximately isotropic position and have LK = O(1). More generally, the K-norm mechanism can be shown to be approximately optimal whenever K is nearly isotropic.
Theorem 5.6 (Theorem 1.2 restated) .
is in c-approximately isotropic position. Then, the K-norm mechanism is -differentially private and has error at most O(cLK ) · LB(F, ).
We can see that the previous upper bound is tight up to a factor of cLK . Estimating LK for general convex bodies is a well-known open problem in convex geometry. The best known upper bound for a general convex body Klartag [20] , improving over the
The conjecture is that LK = O(1).
Conjecture 5.7 (Hyperplane Conjecture).
There exists C > 0 such that for every d and every convex set
Assuming this conjecture we get matching bounds for approximately isotropic convex bodies. 
NON-ISOTROPIC BODIES
While the mechanism of the previous sections is nearoptimal for near-isotropic queries, it can be far from optimal if K is far from isotropic. For example, suppose the matrix F has random entries from {+1, −1} in the first row, and (say) from
the remaining rows. While the Laplacian mechanism will add O( 1 ) noise to the first co-ordinate of F x, the K-norm mechanism will add noise O(d/ ) to the first co-ordinate. Moreover, the volume lower bound LB is at most O(
Rotating F by a random rotation gives, w.h.p., a query for which the Laplacian mechanism adds 2 error O(d/ ). For such a body, the Laplacian and the Knorm mechanisms, as well as the LB are far from optimal.
In this section, we will design a recursive mechanism that can handle such non-isotropic convex bodies. To this end, we will need to introduce a few more notions from convex geometry.
Suppose K ⊆ R d is a centered convex body, i.e. R 
A recursive mechanism
Having defined the covariance matrix, we can describe a recursive mechanism for the case when K is not in isotropic position. The idea of the mechanism is to act differently on different eigenspaces of the covariance matrix. Specifically, the mechanism will use a lower-dimensional version of KM(F, d , ) on subspaces corresponding to few large eigenvalues.
Our mechanism, called NIM(F, d, ), is given a linear mapping F : R n → R d , and parameters d ∈ N, > 0. The mechanism proceeds recursively by partitioning the convex body K into two parts defined by the middle eigenvalue of MK . On one part it will act according to the K-norm mechanism. On the other part, it will descend recursively. The mechanism is described in Figure 6 .1. We remark that the image of PU F is a d -dimensional subspace of R d . We assume that in the recursive call NIM(PU F, d , ), the K-norm mechanism is applied to a basis of this subspace. However, formally the output is a d-dimensional vector.
To analyze our mechanism, first observe that the recursive calls terminate after at most log d steps. For each recursive step m ∈ {0, . . . , log d}, let am denote the distribution over the output of the Km-norm mechanism in step 3. Here, Km denotes the dm-dimensional body given in step m.
Proof. We claim that for every step m ∈ {0, . . . , log d}, the distribution over am is -differentially private. Notice that this claim implies the lemma, since the joint distribution of a0, a1, . . . , am is log(d)-differentially private. In particular, this is true for the final output of the mechanism as it is a function of a0, . . . , am. To see why the claim is true, observe that each Km is the dm-dimensional image of the 1-ball under a linear mapping. Hence, the Km-norm mechanism guarantees -differential privacy by Theorem 4.3.
The error analysis of our mechanism requires more work. In particular, we need to understand how the volume of PU K compares to the norm of PV a. As a first step we will analyze the volume of PU K.
Volume in eigenspaces of the covariance matrix
Our goal in this section is to express the volume of K in eigenspaces of the covariance matrix in terms of the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. This will be needed in the analysis of our mechanism for non-isotropic bodies.
We start with a formula for the volume of central sections of isotropic bodies. This result can be found in [25] .
Here, BK is an explicitly defined isotropic convex body.
From here on, for an isotropic body K, let αK = Ω(LB K /LK ) be a lower bound on Vol k (E ∩ K) 1/(d−k) implied by the above proposition. For a non-isotropic K, let αK be αT K when T is the map the brings K into isotropic position. Notice that if the Hyperplane Conjecture is true, then αK = Ω(1). Moreover, αK is Ω(d 1 4 ) due to the results of [20] .
be an isotropic body with Vol(K) = 1. Let E denote a k-dimensional subspace for 1 ≤ k ≤ d and let P denote an orthogonal projection operator onto the subspace E. Then,
Proof. Observe that the P K contains E ∩ K since P is the identity on E.
We cannot immediately use these results since they only apply to isotropic bodies and we are specifically dealing with non-isotropic bodies. The trick is to apply the previous results after transforming K into an isotropic body while keeping track how much this transformation changed the volume.
As a first step, the following lemma relates the volume of projections of an arbitrary convex body K to the volume of projections of T K for some linear mapping T .
Lemma 6.4. Let K ⊆ R d be a symmetric convex body. Let T be a linear map which has eigenvectors u1, . . . , u d with eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λ d . Let 1 ≤ k ≤ d and suppose E = span{u1, u2, . . . , u k }, Denote by P be the projection operator onto the subspace E. Then,
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that the eigenvectors of T are the standard basis vectors e1, . . . , e d ; this is easily achieved by applying a rotation to K. Now, it is easy to verify that P = P T −1 T = SP T where
Before we can finish our discussion, we will need the fact that the isotropic constant of K can be expressed in terms of the determinant of MK .
We conclude with the following Proposition 6.6.
with and suppose E = span{u1, u2, . . . , u k }, Denote by P be the projection operator onto the subspace E. Then,
where αK is Ω(1/d 
Since λT K is in isotropic position and has unit volume, Corollary 6.3 implies that
Thus the required inequality holds with an additional λ 
Arguing near optimality of our mechanism
Our next lemma shows that the expected squared Euclidean error added by our algorithm in each step is bounded by the square of the optimum. We will first need the following fact. 2 where the maximum runs over all θ ∈ S d−1 such that θ is orthogonal to u1, u2, . . . , ui−1.
Lemma 6.8. Let a denote the random variable returned by the K-norm mechanism in step (3) in the above description of NIM (F, d, ) . Then,
GLB(F, )
2 ≥ Ω(α Proof. For simplicity, we will assume that d is even and hence d − d = d . The analysis of the K-norm mechanism (Theorem 4.3 with p = 2) shows that the random variable a returned by the K-norm mechanism in step (3) satisfies E PV a 
GLB(F, ).
Here we have used the fact that GLB(F, ) ≥ GLB(PU F, ). Finally, the hyperplane conjecture implies maxm α Proof. The mechanism NIM(F, d, / log(d)) satisfiesdifferential privacy, by Lemma 6.1.
The error is at most log(d) √ log d · GLB(F, ) as a direct consequence of Lemma 6.9.
EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION
The costly step in our mechanism is sampling uniformly from high-dimensional convex bodies such as K = F B n 1 . To implement the sampling step efficiently, we will use geometric random walks [12, 28] . It can be shown that these random walks approach the uniform distribution over K in time polynomial in n. We will actually need convergence bounds in the relative ∞-metric, a metric strong enough to entail guarantees about exact differential privacy. We also need to implement a separation oracle for K which can be done using standard convex programming arguments.
Some complications arise, since we need to repeat the privacy and optimality analysis of our mechanisms in the presence of approximation errors (such as an approximate covariance matrix and an approximate separation oracle for K). For details we refer the reader to the full version of this paper.
